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Managerial incentives and social efficiency of entry 
 
1. Introduction 
Social efficiency of entry, which is a major concern to the antitrust authorities, has 
attracted significant amount of attention in recent decades. The literature examining 
social efficiency of entry has gained momentum with the influential work by Mankiw 
and Whinston (1986), which shows that entry is socially excessive in the absence of 
integer constraint. This result, which is often referred as the “excess-entry theorem”
1, 
provides a justification for anti-competitive entry regulation policies.
2 In fact, 
whether or not entry is socially excessive is not merely an issue of simple academic 
interest (Vives, 1988). In the practical dimension, governments in many countries take 
actions to foster or deter entry into particular industries. For example, in the post-war 
period, preventing excessive entry was a guiding principle in the Japanese industrial 
policy (see, e.g., Suzumura and Kiyono, 1987 and Suzumura, 1995). 
                                                      
1 Under excessive entry, social welfare reduces with entry. If entry is insufficient, social welfare 
increases with entry. 
2 See, von Weizsäcker (1980), Perry (1984), Suzumura and Kiyono (1987), Okuno-Fujiwara and 
Suzumura (1993), Anderson et al. (1995) and Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) for other works on excessive 
entry in the presence of scale economies. Ghosh and Saha (2007) suggest excessive entry without scale 
economies but in the presence of marginal cost differences.  2 
 
  While the existing literature examining social efficiency of entry has provided 
several important insights, they are restrictive by considering owners as the managers. 
Indeed, separation between ownership and management is perhaps the norm rather 
than exception in today’s corporate world. Separation between ownership and 
management creates the importance of managerial objectives, as mentioned in Simon 
(1964), Williamson (1964) and Jensen and Meckling (1976), to name a few, and 
requires a proper analysis based on the owner-manager relationship, which also 
questions the profit maximising output choice of the firms (Fershtman and Judd, 
1987). As shown by several authors, such as Vickers (1985), Fershtman and Judd 
(1987), Sklivas (1987) and Miller and Pazgal (2001), the incentive scheme designed 
by the owners affect the product market strategies by affecting their managers’ 
objectives, which, in turn, affect the profits of the owners. Hence, while considering 
the social desirability of entry, a proper analysis based on the strategic owner-manager 
relationship deserves attention. To the best of our knowledge, there is no work 
addressing this issue. We take up this issue here. 
  Based upon a managerial incentive model a la Fershtman and Judd (1987), we 
examine social desirability of entry in a Cournot oligopoly with cost asymmetry. We 
show, in the presence of cost asymmetry, that entry is socially insufficient unless scale 
economies are large. An immediate implication of the result suggests that entry should 3 
 
be generally encouraged in oligopolistic market in the presence of owner-manager 
separation. 
In stark contrast to Ghosh and Saha (2007), which shows that entry is always 
socially excessive with cost asymmetry and no scale economies, we show that entry is 
always socially insufficient with cost asymmetry and no scale economies when, in 
particular, we pay attention to the strategic owner-manager relationship. The product 
market competition underlying in the strategic owner-manager relationship leads to 
our result of insufficient entry, which is clearly distinct from the reasons considered in 
the literature, e.g., integer constraint (Mankiw and Whinston, 1986), timing of entry 
(Cabral, 2004), vertical structure (Ghosh and Morita, 2007a and b), technology 
licensing (Mukherjee and Mukherjee, 2008), positive externality (Mukherjee, 2010) 
and foreign competition (Lim, 2010 and Marjit and Mukherjee, 2010). 
  The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the 
model and derives the results. Section 3 concludes. 
 
2. The model and the results 
Assume that there is a firm (firm 0) with the marginal cost of production  0 c  and 
there is large number of firms, each with the marginal cost  c, where  0 cc < .
3 All 
                                                      
3 The cost difference may be the outcome of technology difference between the firms. 4 
 
firms decide whether to enter the market. We assume that if a firm decides to enter the 
market it needs to incur a fixed cost of entry,  0 K ≥ . We shall conduct our analysis 
separately for both cases of  0 K =   (no scale economies) and  0 K >  (scale 
economies). 
The firms produce a homogeneous product and the inverse market demand 
function is given by P = a – q, where P is price of the product and q is the total 
output. We show in the Appendix the conditions required for our results under a 
general form of market demand function. 
  We assume that the owner of each producing firm delegates incentive scheme to 
a manager, which takes the production decision. We consider the following incentive 
scheme as in Fershtman and Judd (1987): 
 (1 ) ii R απα +− ,                ( 1 )  
where  i π  and  i R   are the profit and revenue of the ith firm respectively.   
  We consider the following game. At stage 1, the firms decide whether or not to 
enter the market. Although all firms decide whether to enter the market, as we will see 
the entry decision will be effectively for the firms with the marginal costs of 
production c, due to their cost disadvantage compared to firm 0, which will always 
enter the market. At stage 2, the owners of all entering firms delegate the incentive 
scheme (1) to the respective managers. At stage 3, all the managers determine their 5 
 
outputs simultaneously and the profits are realised. We solve the game through 
backward induction. 
  We will consider the following assumption in our analysis: 
  A1: 3 ac > . This conditions ensures that at least one firm with the marginal cost 
of production c enters the market. 
  If a firm producing with the marginal cost of production c enters the market, we 
call it as entrant. If firm 0 competes with  ) 1 ( − n entrants, the manager of firm 0 and 
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In the delegation stage, owners of firm 0 and the jth entrant,  1,2,..., 1 j n =− , 
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, 1,2,..., 1 j n = − .             ( 1 3 )  
A straightforward comparison of the outputs and profits (see, (10), (11), (12) and 
(13)) shows that, for any number of firms, n, and  0 cc > , we get 
* *
0 j q q >  and 
* *
0 j π π > , implying that the output and profit of firm 0 are higher than each entrant. 
Hence, the net gain from entry is higher for firm 0 than for an entrant. Clearly, the 
free entry equilibrium number of firms is then determined by 
* 0 j π = , and the profit 7 
 
of firm 0 is positive at the free entry equilibrium. Thus, we conclude that firm 0 will 
always enter the market at the free entry equilibrium, whether or not there are scale 
economies, and the effective entry decisions are for the firms with the marginal costs 
of production c.  
 
2.1. The case of no scale economies (K = 0) 
First consider the case with no scale economies, i.e., K = 0, which facilitates our 
understanding into the effects of scale economies. Under the condition of no scale 
economies, the free entry equilibrium number of firm is determined by the condition 
* 0 j q = , which also implies 









.                      ( 1 4 )  
  Now we want to determine the welfare maximising or socially optimal number 
of firms. Welfare is the sum of profits of all producing firms and consumer surplus. 
We assume that the objective of the social planner is to select the number of firms that 
maximises welfare, given that the owners delegate incentive schemes to the managers 
and the managers choose outputs like Cournot oligopolists. Even if the social planner 




The social planner determines the number of firms it wants to enter the market 
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Note that the social planner will always prefer firm 0 to enter the market, since this is 
the more cost efficient firm. Therefore, the social planner may only restrict entry of 
the firms with the marginal costs of production c.  
The welfare-maximising number of firms, 
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Condition (17) implies that, if there are no scale economies, welfare is increasing at 
the free entry equilibrium number of firms, implying that the welfare-maximising 
number of firm is higher than the free entry equilibrium number of firms in the 
absence of scale economies. 
The above discussion gives the following proposition immediately. 
 9 
 
Proposition 1: Consider the assumption A1 and  0 cc > . If ownership is separated 
from management and there are no scale economies, entry is socially insufficient in 
the presence of strategic incentive delegation by the owners to the managers.  
 
  Proposition 1 is in stark contrast to Ghosh and Saha (2007), which proposes that 
entry is always socially excessive in the absence of scale economies. In contrast, we 
show that entry can always be insufficient in the absence of scale economies, if there 
is separation between ownership and management and the owners choose the 
incentives schemes for their managers strategically. Hence, the anti-competitive entry 
regulation policy suggested by Ghosh and Saha (2007) may not justifiable in the 
presence of cost asymmetry and no scale economies, if the ownership is separated 
from management, which is perhaps the norm rather than exception in today’s world.   
  The intuition for the above result can be provided as follows. In the absence of 
scale economies, welfare rises with entry, which leads the social planner to allow for 
as many firms as possible. However, in the presence of cost asymmetry and incentive 
delegation, only a finite number of firms enter the market at the free entry 
equilibrium. This happens because incentive delegation by the more cost efficient 
firm significantly reduces the profits of the more cost inefficient firms, even if all the 
firms can choose the incentive schemes strategically. Thus, incentive delegation 10 
 
creates insufficient entry by reducing the profits of the more cost inefficient firms and 
therefore, their incentives for entry. 
 
2.2. The case of scale economies (K > 0). 
Now consider the case with scale economies, i.e., K > 0. Under scale economies, free 
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In the presence of scale economies, the social planner maximises the following 
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The welfare-maximising number of firms, 
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It is intuitive that the cost of entry reduces the number of entrants into the market and 
also reduces social desirability of entry by imposing costs to the society. However, 
since entry is socially insufficient for K = 0 and  0 cc > , and (20) is continuous in K, it 
is immediate that entry can be socially insufficient even if K > 0 yet very small. 
It is worth noting from (17) that the difference between c and  0 c  may play an 
important role in determining the social desirability of entry, since the possibility of 11 
 
insufficient entry reduces as the cost difference between firm 0 and the entrants 
reduces.  







  at the free entry 
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Condition (21) suggests that welfare is reducing at the free entry equilibrium number 
of firms, i.e., entry is socially excessive. 
  Clearly, whether welfare is increasing or decreasing at the free entry equilibrium 
number of firms in the presence of scale economies and  0 cc >  is not immediate. In 
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 cannot be 
neatly obtain once we move away from the symmetric case and consider  0 cc > . 
Nonetheless, we can use a simple numerical example to show that entry can be 
socially insufficient under scale economies if  0 cc > . Figure 1 illustrates a case of  
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Figure 1: Excessive and insufficient entry under scale economies with  0 cc > . 
Figure 1 shows that if  0 cc > , welfare in increasing at the free entry equilibrium 
number firms, suggesting entry is socially insufficient, for higher values of n, which 
occurs for relatively lower K (follows from (18)). Hence, as mentioned above, socially 
insufficient entry can occur for lower values of K even under scale economies and 
0 cc > . It is worth mentioning that 
*
0 0 q >  and 




There is a vast literature showing that entry is socially excessive in oligopolistic 
markets. This result provides the justification for anti-competitive entry regulation 
policies. However, the previous works ignore an important empirical regulation, viz., 
separation of ownership and management. The separation of ownership and 
management creates the requirement for considering proper objective functions of the 
managers designed by the respective owners. 13 
 
  Using a simple model of managerial incentives with cost asymmetry, we show 
that endogenous managerial incentive schemes have significant implications on the 
social desirability of entry. In the presence of cost asymmetry, entry is socially 
insufficient unless scale economies are large. An immediate policy implication of our 
analysis suggests that entry should generally be encouraged when ownerships in firms 
















The case of a general demand function: Now consider that the inverse market 
demand function is  ) (q P , with  0 P′<  and  0 P′′≤ . 
  Given the incentive schemes, the managers of firm 0 and the jth entrant 
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  ()
j
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The equilibrium outputs are given by the following expressions: 
 
*
00 0 0 Pc q P α ′ −+=              ( A 3 )  
 
* 0 ii Pc q P α ′ −+ = , 1,2,..., 1 j n =− .          ( A 4 )  
  The owners of firm 0 and the jth entrant,  1,2,..., 1 j n = − , determine the 
incentive schemes by maximising 
0
00 0 0 00 () ( 1 ) Max P c q c q
α α α − −−  and 
() ( 1 )
j
jj jj Max P c q cq
α α α −− − respectively. 
  Now consider the welfare maximising number of firms. Given the symmetry of 
the entrants, the social planner maximises the following expression to determine the 
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  First consider the case of no scale economies, i.e., K = 0. In this situation, we get 
that  P = c at the free entry equilibrium. If we evaluate (A6) at the free entry 
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, i.e., if the equilibrium output of firm 0 increases with n at the 
free entry equilibrium. This condition is satisfied in our analysis in section 2. 
  Now consider the case of scale economies, i.e., K > 0. In this situation, free entry 
equilibrium occurs when 
* () j Pc q K −= , which also implies that P > c. If we evaluate 
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4  This is satisfied in our analysis in section 2. It then follows from 
(A7) and (A8) that the possibility of insufficient entry reduces with scale economies. 











0 j qq =  in this situation. The presence of the business-stealing effect confirms this, 
                                                      
4 We consider the presence of a business-stealing effect even after considering the effect of the number 
of firms on the incentive schemes.  16 
 
which implies that entry is excessive under scale economies if all firms are 
symmetric. 
Given that (A8) is continuous in c, it implies that entry under scale economies 
will be excessive eve if c is greater than but close to  0 c . However, as c increases from 
0 c , it reduces the effect of 
*







  in (A8). Hence, if c is sufficiently larger 
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